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On the Appropriatness of Research Design: 
Intended and Actual Whistleblowing   
Brita Bjørkelo and Hege H. Bye 
 
 
Introduction 
The act of trying to stop ill doing goes way back in time (cf. Park, Rehg and Lee 2005; 
Vinten 1994). However, whistleblowing research is commonly depicted as related to 
civil and worker initiatives in the US in the 1960s and 1970s (Bok 1981). In those 
times, one of the first efforts to create a body of research consisted of compilations of 
case stories of what whistleblowers had experienced (for instance, see Nader et al. 
1972; Peters and Branch 1972). This period also included books and movies based on 
experiences from whole organizations and actual cases (for instance, see Anderson et 
al. 1980; Maas 1973). Later, theoretical papers and empirical research of the act of 
reporting wrongdoing at work became more common (Miceli and Near 1989; 
Parmerlee et al. 1982). While the first compiled versions of whistleblowing cases were 
important for getting attention to the topic, theoretical and empirical research was and 
is crucial to gaining systematic knowledge about whistleblowing at work. 
The act of whistleblowing is commonly defined as ‘the disclosure by organization 
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the 
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect 
action’ (Near and Miceli 1985: 5). Studying real-life whistleblowing is hard due to 
several factors. It is a sensitive topic, so gaining entry into organizations and ensuring 
participants that their anonymity will be kept can be challenging. Moreover, in 
quantitative research designs large samples are necessary to get sufficient numbers of 
silent observers and actual whistleblowers for statistical analyses. Difficulties such as 
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these make it challenging to answer the key question ‘What makes observers of 
wrongdoing decide to blow the whistle?’ As a result, some researchers have turned to 
the study of intentions to report. Focusing on intentions has many advantages. It is less 
sensitive and anyone, not just actual observers or whistleblowers, can report their 
willingness to report various types of wrongdoing. Moreover, in experimental designs 
contextual factors can be manipulated and their causal impact on intentions to report 
can be observed. The problem is that results from studies on actual and indented 
whistleblowing often point in different directions. In this chapter we will argue that 
many of the apparent inconsistencies and lack of coherence in findings are due to 
methodological rather than substantial factors. We will also outline how the reasoned 
action approach (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010)
 
can serve as an integrating theoretical 
framework for research on actual and intended whistleblowing. Finally, we will make 
some practical recommendations for future research on whistleblowing. In the next 
two sections we will first present the two research lines, actual and intended 
whistleblowing, and then we will present some of the measures that seem to be most 
widely applied in the investigation of these two types of whistleblowing.  
The Two Research Lines: Intended and Actual Whistleblowing 
Empirical research on whistleblowing has often focused either on which factors predict 
whistleblowing when people are faced with scenarios describing wrongdoing (intended 
hypothetical reporting), or focused on what employees who have actually reported 
wrongdoing are characterized by and have experienced. Unfortunately, these two 
strands of research have seldom intertwined. In their 2005 meta-analysis of the 
whistleblowing field, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran reported that they had located 
only two studies linking intent to blow the whistle with actual reporting. An overview 
of studies since their review (identified by a cited reference search in the ISI Web of 
Science database, August 2012) shows that intentions to report and actual reporting 
have not been linked in more recent research either (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Whistleblowing Studies after 2005 Citing Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s 
(2005) Meta-Analysis  
Authors Year Intended Actual Relationship 
between intended 
Other 
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and actual 
1. Avery, McKay & Hunter 2012    X 
2. Bashir, Khattak, Hanif & 
Chohan 
2011  X   
3. Calderon-Cuadrado, Alvarez-
Arce, Rodriguez-Tejedo & 
Salvatierra 
2009    X 
4. Casal & Bogui 2008 X    
5. de Graaf 2010    X 
6. Decker & Calo 2007    X 
7. Fredin 2011    X 
8. Hassink, de Vries & Bollen 2007    X 
9. Hedin & Mansson 2012  X   
10. Jackson 2008    X 
11. Jetten, Hornsey, Spears, Haslam 
& Cowell 
2010    X 
12. Kaplan, Pany, Samuels & 
Zhang 
2009 X    
13. Kaplan, Pope & Samuels 2011 X    
14. Kaptein 2011 X    
15. Kish-Gephart, Detert, Trevino 
& Edmondson 
2009    X 
16. Klaas, Olson-Buchanan & Ward 2012    X 
17. Kölbel & Herold 2010    X 
18. Liyanarachchi & Newdick 2009 X    
19. Liyanarachchi & Adler 2011 X    
20. Miceli, Near, & Dworkin 2009    X 
21. Nayir & Herzig 2012 X    
22. Nielsen  & Einarsen 2008  X   
23. Oh & Teo 2010 X    
24. Ohnishi, Hayama, Asai & 
Kosugi 
2008  X   
25. Park, & Blenkinsopp 2009 X    
26. Pauksztat, Steglich & Wittek 2011 X    
27. Pemberton, Tombs, Chan, & 
Seal 
2012    X 
28. Pillay & Dorasamy 2011    X 
29. Richardson & McGlynn 2011  X   
30. Robinson, Robertson & Curtis 2012 X    
31. Rothwell & Baldwin 2007 X X   
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32. Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman and 
& Thornton 
2010 X    
33. Skivenes and Trygstad 2010  X   
34. Stansbury & Victor 2009  X   
35. Taylor & Curtis 2010 X    
36. Teo & Caspersz 2011    X 
37. Trevino, Weaver & Reynolds 2006    X 
38. Vadera, Aguilera & Caza 2009    X 
39. Zhang, Chiu & Wei 2009 X    
40. Zyglidopoulos & Fleming 2008    X 
Total number of studies  15 8 0 17 
 
Our minor pilot review (Table 6.1) shows that there is a tendency towards more focus 
being directed at intended and other aspects of whistleblowing; more so than studies of 
actual whistleblowing and studies of the relationship between intended and actual 
whistleblowing. One way to approach this situation is simply to state that the number 
of studies that address the relationship between intended and actual whistleblowing 
should be increased. Another is to aim at bringing these two lines of research closer 
together through theory, that is, by applying a theoretical perspective  that can provide 
a language for these two lines to talk to each other. 
Another issue raised by the meta-analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 
(2005) is that there are variations in the correlates of intended and actual 
whistleblowing, which at a first glance seem to indicate that there is little value in the 
intent approach for understanding actual whistleblowing.  
 
Measuring Actual Whistleblowing 
Research on actual whistleblowing has been conducted in several ways, although there 
are (as of now) no standard cross-nationally validated instruments for measuring 
whistleblowing at work. However, a dominant tradition in the measurement of actual 
whistleblowing has been the different versions of questionnaires applied in the large 
scale studies conducted by the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) in the US since 
the 1980s (Brown 2008; Near and Miceli 2008). In this tradition, respondents are first 
asked whether they had ‘personally observed or obtained direct evidence of’ one or 
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more of 18 types of wrongdoing (for instance, accepting bribes or kickbacks and/or 
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors that are made a condition of 
employment or are used as a basis for employment or career decisions) during the last 
12 months (Miceli et al. 2012: 933). After this, respondents are asked to select ‘the one 
activity that represents the most serious problem you observed or obtained direct 
evidence of’. Whistleblowing is further measured as the proportion of respondents 
who have observed wrongdoing and have reported it to a valid complaint recipient. In 
addition to yielding information about types of wrongdoing and whistleblowers, this 
approach gives information about whether respondents are aware or unaware of a 
wrongdoing, coded as observers and non-observers respectively, as well as 
respondents who do not report the misconduct they have witnessed, namely inactive or 
silent observers. For a detailed and thorough description of the questions applied, see 
Miceli and colleagues (2012: 933–934).  
The approach employed in the MSPB studies may be labeled a behavioral approach. 
Whistleblowing is measured by asking questions about the observation and reporting 
of wrongdoing and afterwards respondents are categorized into groups such as non-
observers, observers and whistleblowers (Miceli and Near 1984). The behavioral 
approach yields overall information about how much wrongdoing is observed and how 
many blow the whistle. This approach also assumes that the listed wrongdoings, which 
according to the definition should be illegal, unethical or illegitimate acts, are not 
interpreted differently across countries of application.A behavioral approach can have 
limitations when applied as an operational definition across national settings (see, for 
instance, Jubb 1999).  
An alternative is the operational definition approach (Bjørkelo 2010). In this 
tradition, respondents are presented with an operational definition of whistleblowing 
(based on the state of the art definition by Near and Miceli, in Bjørkelo et al., 2010: 
378):  
‘Whistleblowing is when an employee (former or current) that is witnessing or has 
witnessed an unethical, illegal or illegitimate practice at work openly (not anonymous) 
reports about it to a person or a body that has the ability to change the practice. 
Whistleblowing is not when the reporting is done in order to gain personal profit. The 
person or body that receives the report may be internal to the organization (for 
 Page 6 of 28 
 
example: a leader, safety deputy, elected employee representative), but may also be an 
external body or group of influence (for example: the police or other public authorities, 
media, or an environmental organization). Reporting about one’s own exposure to 
workplace bullying, is NOT regarded as whistleblowing’. 
and are then asked whether they would describe themselves as whistleblowers or not. 
Thus, the evaluation of whether the act that is reported is considered illegal, unethical 
and illegitimate is left to respondents in the respective countries where a study is 
conducted. Only thereafter is a list of specific wrongdoing types presented. The 
operational definition approach potentially improves the link between the theoretical 
definition and cultural perceptions of types of wrongdoingThe drawback of this 
approach is that it is not clear whether respondents who do not label themselves as 
‘whistleblowers’ are silent observers or non-observers. In order to calculate the 
prevalence of whistleblowing it is therefore important to include a measure of the total 
amount of wrongdoing observations made before the operational definition is 
presented. Applying operational definitions across nations without any consideration 
or adjustment poses a threat to validity. If no adjustment is made (i.e., an etic 
approach), the underlying assumption is that the same  operational definition can be 
applied universally, regardless of national or cultural context (Ryan et al. 999). When 
culture is taken into consideration (i.e., an emic approach), Ryan and colleagues argue 
that the underlying assumption is that taking into account relevant characteristics of 
the national culture at the place of application is a prerequisite for achieving culture-
appropriate measurement. This is however not to say that the development of a new 
measure in each nation of application is recommended. What is recommended is to 
ensure that the measure intended for use is evaluated and found helpful in the nation of 
application before data are collected. 
Measuring Intended Whistleblowing 
Research on intended whistleblowing has applied a number of measures. One is the 
Whistleblowing Propensity Inventory (WPI). The WPI was developed by Keenan 
(1990), based on the questionnaires applied in the MSPB studies. In the WPI, 
respondents are asked whether they would ‘feel personally obliged to report it’ if they 
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‘were to observe a dishonest or fraudulent activity’ (Keenan 1995: 576). Examples of 
the ten types of fraudulent and wrongful activities provided are stealing funds or 
property, bribes and sexual harassment (Keenan 2000). Changes in terminology from 
the MSPB studies, that concerned federal employees, were made in order to ‘reflect 
work environments of managers within the private sector’ (Keenan 1990: 227). Items 
are introduced as measuring ‘opinions and perceptions about organizational practices 
in regards to whistleblowing’ and respondents are asked to indicate their intention to 
report on a scale from 1 (definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) for each of the ten types of 
wrongdoing (Keenan 1995: 575–576).  
Another way of measuring whistleblowing intent has been applied by Park and 
Blenkinsopp (2009). They measured whistleblowing intention by asking the question: 
‘If you found wrongdoing in your workplace, how hard would you try to do the 
following?’ (Park and Blenkinsopp 2009: 549). This question was followed by eight 
items describing possible complaint recipients inside and outside the organization such 
as ‘Report it to the appropriate authorities outside of the organization’ (external 
whistleblowing) and ‘Report it to the appropriate persons within the organization’ 
(internal whistleblowing). For each of these items, participants were asked to indicate 
how hard they would try to report on a scale ranging from (1) ‘not at all’ to (5) ‘very 
hard’. 
Ellis and Arieli (1999) measured whistleblowing intent by presenting participants 
with three improper situations or scenarios. An example of the situation was the 
following: ‘An officer in your brigade, above you in rank, gave a false report of 
amount of engine running-time during drills’ (Ellis and Ariel 1999: 954). Participants 
were then asked about their whistleblowing intention, measured by the questions ‘If 
you encountered this situation, would you report it?’ Intentions were to be indicated on 
a seven-point scale (-3 through 0 to +3). 
Similarly, in a study of certified accountants, Liyanarachchi and Adler (2011) 
measured whistleblowing intent with the use of the propensity to blow the whistle 
instrument (PBW). In PBW, participants were first presented with three 
whistleblowing scenarios and subsequently asked how likely it was that the ‘individual 
in each of the scenarios would blow the whistle’ (Liyanarachchi and Adler 2011: 172). 
The response categories were on a seven-point Likert type scale for each scenario. The 
 Page 8 of 28 
 
authors then made a composite score of the participants’ responses from the three 
scenarios. In contrast to the other measures of intentions described above which are 
focused on what the respondents themselves would do, Liyanarachchi and Adler’s 
(2011) approach focused on what the respondents believed a third person (described in 
the scenarios) would do.  
In a study by Brabeck (1984), 32 undergraduates first filled out the defining issues 
test (DIT)
1
. Participants were told that the administrator, a graduate student, was 
collecting data for a study he was conducting. The task was to read an article, authored 
by a professor–investigator and answer questions about it in a later test. Participants 
were then presented with different articles that contained errors. After a month, 
participants responded to the whistleblowing questions. Intended whistleblowing was 
measured by the amount of participants who reported on the designed errors in the 
article to the investigator in the trial. In another scenario study, Miceli et al. (1991) 
measured intended whistleblowing by asking participants whether they, during the 
study, were asked to do anything they would consider objectionable. This question 
followed a staged situation where students had ‘witnessed apparent wrongdoing by a 
research assistant’ (Miceli et al. 1991: 271). 
In addition to either actual or intended whistleblowing, the World Online 
Whistleblowing Survey
2
 investigates public views about whistleblowing, and among 
other things, asks participants who are members of an organization whether they 
would feel ‘personally obliged to report it to someone’ in their organization if they 
observed wrongdoing. Participants are asked to respond on a five-point scale ranging 
from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) ‘strongly agree’.  
To summarize, actual whistleblowing is typically measured by either the 
behavioural approach where the respondents indicate whether they have observed and 
reported various types of wrongdoing or by the operational definition approach where 
respondents read a definition of whistleblowing and label themselves as 
whistleblowers or not. Intentions to blow the whistle have been measured by questions 
of whether the respondents would report specific types of wrongdoing (Keenan 1990; 
2000) or report wrongdoing in general (Park and Blenkinsopp 2009), as well as by 
asking respondents to indicate how they themselves or a third person would behave in 
a hypothetical scenario (Ellis and Arieli 1999; Liyanarachchi and Adler 2011). In 
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addition, it can also sometimes be difficult to categorize a study as focusing on either 
purely intended or actual reporting.  
 
Correlates of Intended and Actual Whistleblowing 
Due to the variety of ways to approach whistleblowing in research, Mesmer-Magnus 
and Viswesvaran (2005) compared results from studies focusing on intentions with 
results from studies on actual reporting. One of the main findings from their meta-
analysis was that ‘the predictors of the intent to blow the whistle are not the same as 
those of actual whistleblowing’ (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005: 288). 
Moreover, the authors stated that many of the variables ‘measured in studies of 
whistleblowing are stronger correlates of whistleblowing intent than of whistleblowing 
action’ (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005: 288–289). Finally, they found that 
the very limited research on the relationship between intended and actual 
whistleblowing suggests that whistleblowing intentions are unrelated to actual 
whistleblowing. What do these findings imply? Are intended and actual 
whistleblowing different things? Are studies on intentions to blow the whistle 
uninformative when the goal is to understand whistleblowing in natural contexts? 
Before drawing such conclusions, we will take a closer look at methodological factors 
that may be central to understanding the divergent results.  
To our knowledge, there are no published prospective field studies of 
whistleblowing, that is, studies in which the hypothesized predictors of blowing the 
whistle are measured at one point in time and actual whistleblowing is measured at a 
later time. Rather, field studies of whistleblowing have been cross-sectional and 
focused on asking managers and employees about their experiences (Miceli et al. 
2008).  In scenario studies, on the other hand, the hypothesized predictors are typically 
measured before the respondents engage with the scenario, or predictors are 
experimentally manipulated. In a simplified fashion, we can say that in existing field 
studies the predictors of whistleblowing are measured after the respondents have 
blown the whistle (or decided to remain silent) and in scenario studies the predictors 
are measured before the decision is made. We believe that this is crucial in interpreting 
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the discrepancy between the correlates of intended and actual whistleblowing that 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) described.    
 
For some variables, the timing of measurement is not essential in interpretation. 
For example, demographics (sex, age, tenure, education etc.) and basic personality 
traits that are quite stable in adulthood are not likely to change substantially during the 
whistleblowing process. When whistleblowers are found to be extroverted and report 
that they perceive themselves to be domineering in interpersonal interaction, more so 
than non-reporters (Bjørkelo et al. 2010), is it reasonable to believe that these traits 
predispose individuals to be proactive in the face of wrongdoing. It is unlikely that 
going through a whistleblowing process would make someone not previously 
extroverted, extroverted or someone who perceives him- or herself as submissive, 
domineering in interpersonal interaction. It is however possible that the shape and 
composition of a person’s ‘normal profile’ can stay the same but become elevated in 
stressful situations. Hypothetically, a person that has profile characterised by 
extraversion and interpersonal dominance can for instance devlop a more peaked 
profile (i.e., higher scores on these two dimensions) if they have been exposed to 
retaliation after they reported woringdoing at work. Although some studies have 
investigated the relationship between individual whistleblowing and validated 
measures of personality (see e.g., Bjørkelo, Ryberg, Matthiesen, & Einarsen, 2008), 
few if any have to our knowledge until now measured personality profiles with 
validated measures before and after a whistleblowing and a subsequent retaliatory 
process over time. 
For other variables, the timing of measurement is essential in interpretation. For 
example, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s meta-analysis suggests that threats of 
retaliation negatively impact on observers’ intentions to blow the whistle, but that it is 
not related to actual whistleblowing. How can this be explained?  
In Miceli and Near’s (1984) study (which is included in the Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran’s meta-study), respondents were asked (1) how confident they were that 
they would not be retaliated against if they were to report illegal or wasteful activities 
and (2) how well the Federal Government protected employees who reported illegal or 
wasteful activities. The respondents were next asked to report (3) whether they had 
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observed and reported such activities in the last year. This resulted in a classification 
of the respondents into groups of non-observers, inactive observers, internal 
whistleblowers (internal reporting exclusively) and external whistleblowers 
(predominately combined internal and external reporting).  These four groups differed 
in their perceptions of whether they would be retaliated against, with externals 
perceiving the highest risk of retaliation, followed by inactive observers, internals, and 
non-observers. Based on these findings, Miceli and Near (1984: 701) conclude that 
‘whistle-blowers were not more likely to perceive that a retaliatory climate existed 
than were inactive observers’.  
Does this mean that threat of retaliation does not influence actual whistleblowers’ 
decision to report? What the data do show is that peoples’ experiences of having 
observed (or not observed) and reported (or not reported) in the past influence their 
present estimates of likely retaliation for hypothetical reporting. This does not 
necessarily inform us of how perceived likelihood of retaliation weighted in on the 
whistleblowers’ and inactive observers’ decision at the time when they decided to 
report or not.  This implies that it is premature to conclude that a threat of retaliation is 
only a predictor of intentions to blow the whistle and not of actual whistleblowing.  
Similarly, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found differences in the 
relationship between job satisfaction and intended and actual whistleblowing. Whereas 
job satisfaction was unrelated to intentions to report, it was positively correlated with 
actual reporting (intent r= -0.01; actual r=0.19).  This finding implies that people’s 
level of job satisfaction is not related to their evaluation of what they would do when 
faced with hypothetical wrongdoing. However, people who have blown the whistle 
(and remain with their organization) seem to be a bit more satisfied at work than those 
who did not blow the whistle.  Because job satisfaction fluctuates in response to 
important events at work, these results are uninformative when it comes to 
understanding how a person’s level of job satisfaction at the time when wrongdoing 
was observed and prior to making the decision to report/not report actually influenced 
their decision. As these examples illustrate, some of the apparent inconsistencies in the 
correlates of intent to report and actual reporting may be due to methodological rather 
than substantive issues.  
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Factors Influencing the Predictive Validity of Intentions to Blow 
the Whistle 
The second issue raised by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) is that very few 
studies have linked intentions to blow the whistle with actual reporting. Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) report that they found only two studies that included 
both a measure of intended and actual whistleblowing. The observed mean of the 
correlation between whistleblowing intent and actual whistleblowing was 0.05. Does 
this signify that whistleblowing intentions are unrelated to actual reporting? The 
empirical data are at this point too sparse to draw definite conclusions, but as 
intentions tend to be good predictors of behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010), we 
believe it would be wise to consider some of the factors that may lead to an 
underestimation of the relationship between whistleblowing intentions and behavior.    
Although conceptually, researchers are interested in predicting future behavior 
from intentions, it is not uncommon that a measure of intention is administered along 
with a measure of current or past behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). For example, in 
a field study in a fast food restaurant setting, Victor et al. (1993) assessed an 
employee’s intentions to report on peers who took or gave away an order of French 
fries, and at the same time asked respondents to indicate whether they had reported on 
this type of theft in the past year. This was one of the studies included in Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran’ (2005) analysis. The observed correlation between 
intentions to report and past reporting was r = .18 (p < .05). Aside from the possibility 
that this correlation may be attenuated due to the categorical nature of the 
whistleblowing variable, it is also possible that some of the respondents had 
experienced retaliation after previous reporting and thus would be less willing to report 
peer theft in the future. In fact, Zhang et al. (2009) found, in a scenario study among 
bank employees, that those with previous personal experience with whistleblowing 
tended to have lower scores (r = -.20) on (hypothetical) intentions to report afterwards. 
We have not been able to locate any studies that have looked at the relationship 
between intentions to report (whether hypothetical or actual intentions) and subsequent 
actual reporting.  
It is also important to consider differences between hypothetical and real situations 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Other cognitions (e.g., risk assessments) and emotions 
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(e.g., fear, doubt) may become psychologically salient in real situations and change the 
intentions a person formed when contemplating a hypothetical situation. Being asked 
about one’s general intentions to report wrongdoing, for instance, ‘If you found 
wrongdoing in your workplace, how hard would you try to [report to different 
recipients]?’ (Park and Blenkinsopp 2009: 549) is therefore likely less predictive of 
people’s actual reporting at a later time, than intentions formed when one has actually 
observed wrongdoing and consider reporting in real life. For instance would MacNab 
and colleagues (2007:23) argue that studies on whistleblowing intent not are  assumed 
to evoke ‘the type of real-world pressure faced by someone in an actual situation’. 
Intentions may also change over time, and temporally unstable intentions are less 
likely to predict behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). At this point, the stability of 
observers’ intentions to report from when the initial intentions are formed to when the 
act of blowing the whistle is performed or the decision to remain silent is made is not 
known. These factors pose a challenge in terms of deciding on an optimal time lag 
between the measurement of intentions to report and actual reporting. On the one hand, 
one could expect intentions to remain fairly stable over weeks or months after the 
decision to blow the whistle is made if the observer is determined to report the 
wrongdoing and is just waiting for the right time and opportunity. On the other hand, 
one could argue that intentions to blow the whistle are likely to be unstable and change 
quickly in response to certain situations and external events (e.g., threat of retaliation 
and job loss). A decision making process predominantly characterised as a ‘choice-less 
choice’ and a feeling of being ‘compelled to act’ has for instance previously been 
described by Alford (2001, 2007).It seems clear that the intended–actual 
whistleblowing relationship is under-investigated in whistleblowing research and the 
research that exists is likely to underestimate the relationship due to the timing of 
measurement (i.e., measuring intentions after reporting). In addition to an increased 
focus on methodological issues when trying to integrate research on whistleblowing 
intentions and behavior, we would like to propose that the reasoned action approach 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 2010) can serve as a useful integrative framework. The reasoned 
action approach has a long history from Fishbein’s expectancy–value model, to the 
theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour. We focus on Fishbein 
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and Ajzen’s most recent conceptualization as described in their 2010 book Predicting 
and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach. 
The Reasoned Action Approach 
The central idea in the reasoned action approach is that human social behavior can be 
predicted by a set of core factors, namely attitudes, perceived norms, perceived and 
actual behavioral control, and intentions ( for a model and illustration of the theory see 
instance
3
). Attitudes have their basis in behavioral beliefs, which are beliefs about the 
positive or negative consequences (i.e., costs and benefits) of performing the behavior 
in question. An attitude towards a specific behavior is the person’s positive or negative 
evaluation of personally performing the behavior. Perceived norms have their basis in 
normative beliefs, which are people’s beliefs about whether individuals or groups who 
are important to them (i.e., referents) would approve of their performing the behavior 
and whether these referents (would) perform the behavior themselves. Together, these 
normative beliefs create a perception of the normative pressures to perform or not 
perform the behavior in question. A person’s perceived behavioral control finds its 
basis in control beliefs, which are beliefs about factors in the environment or personal 
factors that can help or impede performance of the behavior.  
Together, a person’s attitude towards a specific behavior, perceived norms 
regarding the behavior, and perceived control over the behavior inform the person’s 
intention or readiness to perform the behavior (for an illustration of the model, see for 
instance
4
). Actual performance of the behavior becomes more likely as the intention to 
perform it becomes stronger. However, this hinges on the condition that the person’s 
perceived behavioral control accurately reflects his/her actual control (i.e., relevant 
skills and abilities, barriers and facilitating factors) over the behavior. Actual 
behavioral control therefore moderates the relationship between intentions and 
behavior. When perceived behavioral control matches actual behavioral control it also 
acts as a moderator between intentions and behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). In 
addition to these core components, a host of background factors can be incorporated 
into a reasoned action model to explain individual and contextual origins of the 
different beliefs underlying the behavior. 
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Interpretation of Whistleblowing Studies within the Reasoned Action 
Approach  
The model of whistleblowing as prosocial organizational behavior proposes that when 
someone has identified an activity as wrongful (phase 1), experiences that it is not 
being corrected (phase 2), and decides that they have a responsibility to report and that 
whistleblowing is an available option (phase 3), the person weights the potential cost 
and benefits of blowing the whistle as well as other options for action (see Miceli et al. 
2008: 38 for an illustration of the model). It is primarily in this final stage of decision-
making that the processes described by the reasoned action approach take place.  
Some researchers have already employed a version of the reasoned action approach 
in the study of whistleblowing (Ellis and Arieli, 1999; Oh and Teo 2010; Park and 
Blenkinsopp 2009). In a questionnaire study among South Korean police officers, Park 
and Blenkinsopp (2009) asked their respondents to indicate their (hypothetical) 
intentions to blow the whistle internally and externally if they were to observe 
wrongdoing at work. General attitudes to whistleblowing and subjective norms 
correlated with intentions to report both internally (r = .37 and r = .42, respectively), 
and externally (r = .25 and r = .33, respectively), and perceived behavioral control 
predicted intentions to report internally (r = .28).  
Similarly, Ellis and Arieli (1999) asked general officers in the Israeli Defence Forces 
to report their (hypothetical) intentions to blow the whistle in three different scenarios 
and measured their general attitudes and subjective norms regarding reporting. They 
found that attitudes and norms correlated with intentions to report across scenarios (r = 
.47 to .64 and r = .48 to .58, respectively), but norms were the stronger predictor of 
intentions. What these studies demonstrate is that the reasoned action approach can be 
applied to intended whistleblowing. However, because they were focused on 
hypothetical scenarios they did not include a behavioral component (i.e., actual 
whistleblowing). This is a valuable point of entrance for future research. In the 
following section we will describe the core constructs in the reasonedaction approach 
in more detail and outline how existing whistleblowing research that did not have this 
theoretical starting point can be interpreted in light of the reasoned action model.   
Behavioral Beliefs and Attitudes to Whistleblowing 
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An attitude to an object is determined by the strength of beliefs that the object has 
certain attributes and the positive/negative evaluation of those attributes (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). In our context the object is the behavior of blowing the whistle, and the 
attributes can be, for example, ethicality (‘whistleblowing is the right thing to do’), 
expected efficacy (‘whistleblowing will terminate the wrongdoing’), and potential for 
retaliation (‘whistleblowing is punished’). Beliefs regarding these and other attributes 
of whistleblowing may be held with varying strength. An observer of wrongdoing may 
strongly believe that blowing the whistle is the ethically right thing to do, but be less 
certain in her belief that it will be effective. Moreover, each attribute may be evaluated 
differently; stopping wrongdoing may have a strong positive evaluation, and being 
retaliated against a strong negative evaluation. This means that two observers of 
wrongdoing may hold an equally favorable attitude to reporting, but for different 
reasons.  
Some of the predictors included in prior whistleblowing research constitute 
behavioral beliefs. For example, Chiu (2003) focused on the belief that whistleblowing 
is ethical. Others have included beliefs such as likelihood of protection from retaliation 
(Miceli and Near 1984), anticipated regret associated with whistleblowing versus 
remaining silent (Fredin 2011), and beliefs that reporting ethical concerns 
(whistleblowing) would result in being seen as a troublemaker and snitch (Stansbury 
and Victor 2009).  
In research where the reasoned action approach has been employed, a wider set of 
behavioral beliefs have been investigated. Ellis and Arieli (1999) listed between 15 
and 21 behavioral outcomes for each of their scenarios. The beliefs were centered 
around organizational revenge or positive responses (e.g., ‘My report will stand out as 
an educational example’ and ‘My periodical evaluation will be hurt’), the negative or 
positive influence of reporting on the opinions of others (‘My status with my 
commanders will rise’ and ‘The brigade’s soldiers and commanders will plot against 
me’), and positive and negative implications directly related to the job (e.g., ‘The 
armoured military vehicle will be serviced according to its running time’). Similarly, 
Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) included behavioral beliefs such as that whistleblowing 
prevents harm to the organization and can lead to control of corruption.   
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Thus, organizational members tend to hold both positive and negative beliefs about 
reporting organizational wrongdoing. This could be a contributing factor to the rather 
weak relationships between separate behavioral beliefs and actual whistleblowing 
(Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005; Miceli and Near 1984; Stansbury and Victor 
2009). We propose that, in accordance with the reasoned action approach, the 
combination of salient beliefs regarding whistleblowing will be a better predictor of 
attitudes to whistleblowing, and subsequently intentions to blow the whistle and actual 
reporting, than single beliefs. This is consistent with the idea put forth by Miceli et al. 
(2008), that the final step in the decision-making process leading up to whistleblowing 
is an evaluation of the ratio of benefits versus costs of reporting and which also is 
described in actual whistleblowing cases (see e.g., Bjørkelo, 2010).  
Normative Beliefs and Perceived Norms 
Beyond beliefs about the pros and cons of blowing the whistle, an observer of 
organizational wrongdoing will also have normative beliefs pertaining to 
whistleblowing. In the reasoned action framework, norms are the ‘perceived social 
pressure to perform (or not perform) a given behavior’ (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010:  
130). More specifically, there are two types of perceived norms: perceptions of what 
important others think one should do (injunctive norms) and perceptions of what 
others actually do (descriptive norms). Injunctive normative beliefs pertaining to 
whistleblowing can be based on what other organizational members such as colleagues 
and supervisors would expect (e.g., ‘My boss would expect me to report this’) whereas 
descriptive normative beliefs can be based on what similar others do (e.g., ‘I know that 
my colleagues have reported previously in similar situations’). Beyond giving 
information about what others do, descriptive norms inform us what is likely to be an 
effective and adaptive action. Referring to work by Cialdini, Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010: 132) state that: 
‘[I]n addition to the direct effect of descriptive norms on intentions described earlier, 
descriptive norms can also have indirect effects. We often have information about the 
behavior of others that goes beyond simply registering what they are doing. First, we 
may note that their behavior is rewarded or punished by others, and this information 
can influence attitudes toward the behavior as well as lead to the inference that the 
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behavior is prescribed or proscribed (injunctive norm). Second, we may learn that the 
behavior leads to other positive or negative outcomes, again affecting attitudes, and 
third, we may learn that certain resources are required and certain barriers have to be 
overcome to perform the behavior. The latter would influence perceptions of 
behavioral control’.  
The normative perspective has been included in existing whistleblowing research 
mainly by the focus on organizational climate for whistleblowing which has been 
found to be related to both whistleblowing intentions and actual reporting (Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005). Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) looked at 
whistleblowing in the police, ethical climate and five forms of misconduct. Team 
climate was measured with Victor and Cullen’s (1988) typology of ethical climates 
and consists of ‘self-interest, company profit or efficiency, friendship or team interest, 
social responsibility, personal morality, rules or standard operating procedures, and 
law and professional code’ (Rothwell and Baldwin 2007: 343). The results indicated 
that a friendship or team climate (a type of perceived norms) generally explained the 
willingness to report wrongdoing at work, but not actual whistleblowing frequency.  
In a study of 6000 workers, Trygstad (2010) found that organizational climate 
influences whether employees dare to report wrongdoing at work and experience 
protection against retaliation. Thus, whistleblowing is ‘not purely an individual-level 
phenomenon’ but depends on the level of ethical culture at the workplace (Zhang et al. 
2009: 643). A healthy organizational culture is also found to be associated with a 
greater willingness to report wrongdoing at work (Kaptein 2011). Thus, in relation to 
the reasoned action approach, we would propose that organizational cultures or 
climates are background factors that influence employees’ perceived norms regarding 
whistleblowing.  
Control Beliefs and Perceived Behavioral Control 
Similar to the way behavioral beliefs inform attitudes to whistleblowing, beliefs about 
internal and external factors that may help or hinder performance of a behavior inform 
a person’s perceived control over the behavior. Control beliefs may be based on 
previous personal experiences, second-hand information (e.g., observations of co-
workers’ experiences) as well as other factors that influence one’s perceived ability to 
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perform the behavior. More specifically, perceived behavioral control is a function of 
the strength of salient beliefs about control factors combined with the perceived power 
of each factor in helping or impeding performance (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). For 
example, an observer of wrongdoing may believe that information about the correct 
procedure for internal reporting is readily available to him, and that this makes 
reporting somewhat easier. At the same time, he may be convinced that blowing the 
whistle requires him to present the evidence in an assertive manner and that this makes 
reporting difficult. Descriptions of actual whistleblowing cases have shown that the 
existence and awareness of reporting procedures is not necessarily associated with an 
effective whistleblowing (e.g., that wrongdoing is stopped) or whistleblower 
protection (see e.g., Monsen 2008).  
Various variables have been included that measure characteristics thought to reflect 
control or power in the whistleblowing situation, such as tenure, age, job level, pay 
grade and supervisor status (Miceli et al. 2008; Skivenes and Trygstad 2010). When 
relationships between these variables and intended or actual whistleblowing are found 
to be significant, they suggest that whistleblowers are more powerful than those who 
did not blow the whistle (Miceli et al. 2008).  For example, Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran (2005) found that job level was positively related to both intended and 
actual whistleblowing. These findings are replicated in recent research: Bjørkelo and 
colleagues found that respondents holding a leadership position or who were union or 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) representatives were more likely to report 
wrongdoing at work (Bjørkelo et al. 2011). Similarly, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) 
found that supervisory status was a consistent predictor of both willingness and 
frequency of whistleblowing. With respect to age and tenure, Stansbury and Victor 
(2009) found that young and short-tenured employees were less likely to have blown 
the whistle. From a reasoned action perspective this makes sense, because employees’ 
job level and similar variables should be related to their control beliefs as well as 
reflect their actual behavioral control.  
Also, many of the personality or individual difference variables investigated in 
prior whistleblowing research are related to control, such as internal locus of control, 
self-esteem, proactive personality, extrovert character and interpersonal dominance 
(Bjørkelo et al. 2010; Miceli et al. 2008; Miceli et al. 2012). There is evidence that 
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whistleblowers are more extroverted, dominant and disposed to be proactive than their 
non-whistleblowing colleagues (Bjørkelo et al., 2010; Miceli et al. 2012). What is 
interesting to note is that in the study by Miceli and colleagues (2012), a more direct 
measure of perceived control in the whistleblowing situation (perceived leverage in the 
situation) was a stronger predictor of actual whistleblowing (odds ratio 2.34, 
95%CI=[1.89, 2.90]) than the dispositional variable of proactive personality (odds 
ratio 1.43, 95%CI=[1.18, 1.74]). Interpreted in light of the reasoned action framework, 
this could suggest that dispositional aspects of control (e.g., proactive personality) can 
be thought of as distal background factors influencing employees’ control beliefs and 
perceived behavioral control in the specific whistleblowing situation, which in turn are 
more proximal antecedents of actual whistleblowing. The same argument can be 
applied to power-related demographical variables.  
Future Directions 
Ideally, the methods used for providing knowledge should depend on the research 
aims. In this way, aims of study would determine whether to study intended or actual 
whistleblowing. Studies of factors that influence intentions (through attitudes, norms, 
control and underlying beliefs) are informative. However, when the situation changes, 
so do attitudes and norms. It is therefore important to include attitudinal, normative, 
and control variables along with intent, actual, contextual and other individual 
difference variables. 
An ideal design would be to survey a very large sample of employees and identify 
those who are witnessing (or have recently witnessed) wrongdoing at work, but have 
not yet decided whether or not to act. These observers could be asked to indicate their 
attitudes towards reporting the wrongdoing, their subjective norms regarding reporting, 
perceived control over reporting, and intentions to report. After a period of time, the 
observers would be surveyed again at one or more occasions to assess actual 
whistleblowing. It is commonly argued that it is extremely difficult to collect 
longitudinal data from the same set of individuals on whistleblowing because of issues 
related to anonymity (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005; Miceli et al. 2008). We 
agree that it is difficult; however, it is not impossible.   
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The Bergen Bullying Research Group at the University of Bergen, Norway
5
, has 
conducted a three-wave longitudinal survey that included questions about 
whistleblowing along with other sensitive topics such as bullying, workplace conflict, 
sexual harassment and health (Berthelsen et al. 2008). The data collection was 
managed by Statistics Norway, the Norwegian National Bureau of Statistics. Statistics 
Norway has access to all inhabitants’ personal identification numbers (NO), which 
correspond to peoples’ national insurance number (UK) or social security number 
(US). The respondents were informed that 1) the survey was performed in accordance 
with Norwegian laws and regulations, 2) Statistics Norway was subjected to the 
control of the Norwegian Data Protection Authority as well as their own Ombudsman 
for the protection of privacy in research, 3) the survey was approved by the Regional 
Ethics Committee for research, 4) it would not be known outside Statistics Norway 
what individuals had responded to the survey and that staff at Statistics Norway were 
bound by legal confidentiality, 5) the researchers would receive anonymous data, and 
6) the identifying information would be completely deleted after the final wave. The 
response rate was 56.4 % in the first wave and 70.0 % per cent in the second wave 
(Berthelsen et al. 2008; Nielsen et al. 2012) . A third wave has also been conducted 
but has not been described in a public report yet (personal communication, S. Einarsen 
September 2012). These numbers suggest that it is not unlikely that participants in 
some situations and nations will be willing to respond even when the topic is sensitive 
and remaining completely anonymous not is possible. In order to conduct such a 
research design anonymity is crucial, particularly when responses need to be matched 
across time. This can be solved with a unique respondent-generated code. Further, 
there are available guidelines for constructing questionnaires to measure the 
components of the reasoned action approach.  
Conclusions 
One of the main recommendations from the 1996 review of the whistleblowing field 
was the importance of ‘scholars in all fields to acknowledge the existence of the 
whistle-blowing myths and the misinformation that perpetuates them, as well as 
opportunities for interdisciplinary cooperation in investigating the whistle-blowing 
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phenomenon’ (Near and Miceli 1996: 523). We would also like to draw attention to 
the recommendation from the 2005 review by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (: 
295): ‘to advance our understanding of this field, we need to explore and enumerate 
the processes that occur between the time wrongdoing is witnessed and when actual 
whistleblowing occurs’. We would like to join in on these recommendations and 
expand the focus to the way whistleblowing is investigated globally. Developing 
measures that can be applied across countries is one important task for future research, 
as it will allow for comparisons across cultural contexts and ease interpretation of 
findings.Furthermore, research on intended and actual whistleblowing needs to be 
integrated in order to understand when and how intentions to report wrongdoing turns 
into whistleblowing (action). As argued throughout the present chapter, one way to do 
it is by applying the theoretical framework of reasoned action. This framework 
specifically addresses the link between intent and actual behavior and has documented 
well the predictive effect of intentions on behavior (Augoustinos and Walker 1999). A 
reasoned action approach can also serve to integrate our understanding of more distal 
antecentents of whistleblowing,  such as organizational climates and individual 
differences, into a coherent theroretical framework.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The DIT was developed by Rest based on the work by Kohlberg on moral reasoning (Rest et al. 2000). The aim 
of the DIT is to understand and predict moral behavior (Marnburg 2001). The regular version of the DIT consists of 
six ethical dilemmas that are followed by 12 items that represent issues that can be considered in the decision-
making process (Rest et al. 1997). The participant is then asked to rate ‘each item in terms of how important it is, 
and then rank the most important items (the top four ranks)’ (Rest et al. 1997:  500). 
2 https://whistleblowingsurvey.org. 
3 http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.diag.html  
4 http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.diag.html  
5 http://www.uib.no/rg/bbrg/  
